Forms and the Origin of Self-Predication

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"We know, to begin with, that Socrates thinks of 'Justice' as the name of a universal and that he does *not* think of universals as persons, nor yet as ontological dependencies of persons, such as actions, decisions, dispositions, practices, or policies of this or that person. This being the case, to say of any universal that it is just or unjust, pious or impious, brave or cowardly would be sheer nonsense: these are moral predicates, and for that reason they are as impredicable of a logical entity, like a universal, as of a mathematical entity, like a number or a geometrical figure: to say that Justice is pious would be as absurd as to say that the number eight or a hexagon is pious." (Vlastos 1972)[1]

1. Introduction

Plato's claims of the form "justice is just" or "holiness is holy" are typically called "self-predications," a term introduced to the study of Plato by Gregory Vlastos.[2] In the above passage, Vlastos captures why these sentences can seem so absurd to us.[3] We can put it this way: it seems like a category mistake to say that justice is just or holiness holy. Justice and holiness are abstract entities, not the sort of things that can be just or holy. Yet Socrates and his interlocutors not only say that holiness is holy, but that it is obviously holy. What seems obvious to them seems absurd to us.

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[1] 444-445, emphasis his.

[2] The term first occurs in Vlastos 1954. I use the 1972 quotation because it nicely captures why Vlastos thinks self-predication is, on its face, absurd. In Vlastos' original usage, "self-predication" picked out a particular way of interpreting such sentences, whereas I (following common practice) use it to pick out any sentence that has the appropriate form. Vlastos had a number of ideas for how to explain self-predication. Famously, he defended Pauline

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predication in a number of his works (e.g., Vlastos 1972, 440, 1973 (passim), and 1974 (passim)), a notion first developed by Sandra Peterson and presented in Peterson 1973.

[3] The apparent absurdity of self-predication is noted at the outset by most scholars who discuss self-predication and then used to motivate the need for an account. See, e.g., Ross 1951, 88 (who doesn't use the term "self-predication"), Nehamas 1979, 93, Meinwald 1992, 365, and Dancy 2004, 121. A major aim of Penner 1987 is to avoid attributing literal self-predication to Plato, a view that he says would be "*entirely* extraordinary. Crazy in fact" (9).

Socrates and his interlocutors treat self-predication as obvious in many dialogues, including the *Protagoras*, *Hippias Major*, and *Euthydemus*, which do not mention any contrast between forms and sensible things and, in part for that reason, are generally thought to come before Plato's middle period dialogues.[4] For example, in the *Protagoras* Socrates says to an imagined objector, "Quiet, man! Hardly another thing would be holy if holiness itself is not holy" (330d-e). Protagoras agrees that he would say the same thing. In the *Hippias Major* self-predication is presupposed through much of the discussion and endorsed in a number of places; for example, Socrates and Hippias agree that the fine is "that which is fine always and for everyone" (292e). And in the *Euthydemus* Socrates says "I thought not even a child would doubt that the different is different" (301c).[5] Thus, following what now seems to be the consensus, I take Socrates to be committed to self-predication not only in the dialogues typically taken to be middle and late, but across all of the dialogues.[6] Perhaps in Plato's middle or late dialogues we can find an explanation of self-predication derived from features of Platonic metaphysics. But the aim of this paper is to explain why he thought self-predication was obvious in the first place, without having to bring in claims from other dialogues. Such an explanation will help us understand the *Protagoras*, *Hippias* Major, and *Euthydemus* in their own right. This paper does not directly address puzzles that involve self-predication, such as the third man argument in the *Parmenides*; however, it provides the first step toward understand such puzzles: once we understand why Plato finds self-predication obvious, we can better appreciate why he thinks, for example, that the third man argument poses a serious problem.

[4] This paper sometimes refers to the standard chronology of Plato's dialogues, although the paper's main claims do not require that we accept this chronology. They require that Plato sometimes expects us to accept self-predication without relying on ideas found in dialogues standardly identified as middle or late. Even if one does not think that these three dialogues (*Protagoras*, *Hippias Major*, *Euthydemus*) were written earlier in Plato's career, it is likely that Plato expects us to be able to understand them without drawing on claims found in the other dialogues. "Socrates" refers to the character and "Plato" to the author. In this paper I do not attribute distinct views to them.

[5] Εὐφήμει, ὦ ἄνθρωπε· σχολῇ μεντἄν τι ἄλλο ὅσιον εἴη, εἰ μὴ αὐτή γε ἡ ὁσιότης ὅσιον ἔσται (Protagoras, 330d-e); ὃ πᾶσι καλὸν καὶ ἀεί ἐστι (*Hippias Major*, 292e); ἔγωγε οὐδ' ἂν παῖδα ᾤμην τοῦτο ἀπορῆσαι, ὡς οὐ τὸ ἕτερον ἕτερόν ἐστιν (*Euthyd.,* 301c). Throughout, translations are my own. The *Euthydemus* passage is valuable, since Socrates considers self-predication to be obvious, but considers the relation between forms and ordinary things to be very difficult (301a). Russell Jones 2010 makes a reasonable case for transitional, pre-*Republic* dating, although this is not necessary for my paper.

[6] A few scholars (e.g., Malcolm 1991), contrary to this consensus, want to provide a general explanation of self-predication using claims from the middle-period dialogues, so they devise one set of explanations for self-predication in the earlier dialogues (see also Wolfsdorf 2002), and a different explanation for it in the middle and late dialogues. On this sort of strategy, in the *Protagoras* Plato makes claims like "justice is just" because of the particular entities (justice, holiness) he is discussing. I discuss Malcolm's view in section 3.2.

I argue that we need to rethink what justice, holiness, and other such things are for Plato. We should not be confident, as Vlastos is, that we understand what Plato means by justice and then puzzled about what he says is obviously true of it. Beginning in his early dialogues, Plato uses the terms "*eidos*" and "*idea*," translated "form," for the thing picked out by the answer to a definitional question like "what is justice?"[7] In this paper I hold it as a fixed point that for Plato forms obviously self-predicate and then find an explanation for why he thinks this way. For us, the meaning of an abstract noun like "justice" is somewhat fixed, even if relevant philosophical debates are still unresolved. But in the fifth and fourth centuries B.C.E., the use of abstract nouns in Greek was on the rise.[8] And while earlier philosophers, poets, historians, medical writers, and other intellectuals used these words, Plato may have been the first to reflect quite generally on what sort of thing these nouns pick out.

The paper proceeds in three parts. The first aims to reset our understanding of how Plato thinks of forms. I use ordinary definitions proposed in the dialogues to develop an account that avoids Vlastos' concern that self-predication is absurd. However, this account reveals a more serious problem, which I call "the real puzzle of self-predication." In the second part of the paper, I argue that to resolve this puzzle we must rethink Plato's forms in light of the etymology of the terms he uses for them: "*eidos*" and "*idea*." "*eidos*" and "*idea*" originally referred to a thing's appearance and then expanded their semantic range so they could pick out something roughly like a type or nature, although the authors using these terms do not seem to think of an *eidos* or *idea* in quite the way that we think of types or natures. In particular, *eidos* and *idea* continued to have some features of appearances, even while being quite different from them in other respects. I argue that this is how Plato is using these terms: as similar to a nature or a type in most ways, but similar to an appearance in a way crucial for resolving the real problem of self-predication and for explaining why he thinks it is obvious that forms self-predicate. Of course, on this account forms are not sensible nor are they misleading in the way appearances can be; in most ways they are like types or natures, not appearances. In the third section of the paper, I

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[7] Plato does not use these terms to pick out things like justice or holiness in the *Protagoras*. They are used in the *Euthyphro, Meno,* and *Hippias Major*, as discussed in the next section. My claim is that the way that Plato thought about forms influenced his overall thinking about things like justice and holiness.

[8] See Denniston 1960 ch. 2 and especially Long 1968 ch. 2, which is recommended to anyone interested in the pre-Platonic use of abstract nouns. Both works make clear that in the fifth century there was a rise both in abstract nouns formed from an article and adjective and in newly coined abstract nouns formed from verbs and adjectives (with endings such as –ία). This is linked to the rise of philosophical, medical, and historical treatises.

bring out a central virtue of this account: unlike many others, it does not require us to posit a new meaning or use of "is" or "just" in a self-predication like "justice is just." This makes it much easier to understand how Plato uses self-predication in his arguments. In the conclusion, I briefly point to some ways that this account sheds light on forms in the dialogues typically taken to be middle-period.

2.1 Unproblematic self-predication

I begin by developing an account of self-predication that avoids Vlastos' concern that it is an absurd category mistake. There are two steps to developing this account. First, we need to broaden the way we ordinarily think about predication. Paradigm cases of predication are found in sentences in which a property is attributed to an object. But there are plenty of cases of predication where the grammatical subject, at least on the surface, does not pick out an object. For example:

1. Living beyond one's means is foolish.
2. Having money is useful.
3. Being safe is wise.

In these cases, it is an activity or state that has something predicated of it. While someone could argue that each of these sentences fundamentally involves one or more objects that have a property, it certainly is not the only way to understand these sentences.[9] Let us read (1)-(3), at least for now, as their surface grammar suggests: something is predicated of the subject and the subject in this case picks out an activity or state.

Our next step is to reset our thinking about Plato's forms, so we can see why they would self-predicate. In the *Euthyphro* (5d and 6d-e), *Meno* (72c), and *Hippias Major* (289d) Plato calls

[9] For example, if one believed that activities could not, strictly speaking, bear these properties, one might want to read 1 as:

1'. Anyone who lives beyond her means is a foolish person.

But we are under no obligation to read 1 as 1'. Moreover, 1' has problems: sometimes very reasonable people do foolish things and so 1' looks to be strictly false, because someone can live beyond one's means once and not be a foolish person. This might lead you to try to modify 1' to:

1''. Someone who lives beyond her means is foolish insofar as she lives beyond her means.

Or perhaps one would be tempted to give a Davidsonian account of 1, where it involves quantification over events. I hope at this point it is clear that this is a rather sophisticated theory of what 1 is saying. While it might be correct, it is not only way to try to understand 1.

the thing referred by the answer to a "What is F-ness?" question an "*eidos*" or "*idea*," standardly translated "form." It is illuminating to begin with proposed answers to "What is F-ness?" found in the dialogues and use these to think about self-predication, rather than start, as Vlastos does, with a theoretical account of what forms are supposed to be ("We know, to begin with, that Socrates thinks of 'Justice' as the name of a universal and that he does *not* think of universals as persons, nor yet as ontological dependencies of persons, such as actions, decisions, dispositions, practices, or policies of this or that person"). We will consider a claim, such as "temperance is temperate," in which I have substituted for "temperance" a proposed definition from the *Charmides*; I call these "substituted self-predications." The idea is that these proposed definitions might reveal how the interlocutors are thinking about F-ness – which might help us understand why they accept self-predication. Of course, Socrates ultimately rejects almost all of the proposed definitions, so we need to be careful about what morals can be drawn.[10] Nonetheless, this procedure will prove useful, since it shows what is wrong with Vlastos' concern and helps us appreciate a much more serious puzzle.

Let us start with some cases where substituted self-predication does not seem problematic.[11]

4. Minding one's own business is temperate.[12]
5. Treating one's friends well and one's enemies badly is just.[13]

Again, these are not direct quotations; instead, they are self-predication claims (e.g., "temperance is temperate") with proposed definitions from the *Charmides* and *Republic* substituted in for "temperance" and "justice." 4 and 5 are parallel to 1-3 since they pick out an activity and then predicate something of that activity. And, like 1-3, there seems to be nothing mysterious about them; we do not need a special theory to understand what 5 means. In fact, if they are false, they seem to be false for the reason they are poor answers: sometimes minding one's own business is not temperate (for example, if one does not know that one is minding one's own business, 164a-

[10] I do not include proposed definitions that Socrates rejects for misunderstanding his question. I only consider proposals he treats as understanding the question, but failing to provide an adequate definition.
[11] See the appendix for a table of proposed answers to "what is it?" questions in some of the early and middle period dialogues and whether they intuitively self-predicate.
[12] Definition of σωφροσύνη: "τὸ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν," *Charmides* 161b.
[13] Definition of δικαιοσύνη: "τὸ τοὺς φίλους ἄρα εὖ ποιεῖν καὶ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς κακῶς," *Republic* 332d.

d). But if “minding one’s own business” *were* the correct definition of temperance, then 4 would be true.

One might wonder what we can learn from these substitutions, since when you substitute co-referential terms you generally do not preserve obviousness: if it is obvious that Hesperus is in the sky, it is not necessarily obvious that Phosphorus is. But if we are puzzled about why someone thinks that something is obvious, it can be useful to know how he or she thinks about that thing. If someone thinks that Hesperus is Phosphorus, then this could explain why, when hearing that Hesperus is in the sky, she takes it as obvious that Phosphorus is. Similarly, if someone thinks that what justice is is *doing one’s own work*, this might explain why they think that justice is just. The idea is that the interlocutors’ proposals might help us understand why they think of F-ness in such a way that it self-predicates.

As Alexander Nehamas has pointed out, in some cases Socrates and his interlocutors introduce their proposed definitions using substituted self-predication.[14] For example:

6. “Returning what one owes is just.”[15] (*Republic* 331e)
7. “What is dear to the gods is holy.”[16] (*Euthyphro* 6e-7a)

Given 4-7, we should be wary of Vlastos’ confidence that justice cannot be the sort of thing to have a moral predicate like just, nor holiness the sort of thing to have a moral predicate like holy. 4-7 give us concrete accounts of things like justice and holiness where they can easily bear these predicates. We need to keep an open mind about how Plato thinks about such entities, to see if he thinks of them in a way that makes self-predication obvious, rather than assume, with Vlastos, that Plato thinks of them as logical entities and that we know how predicates apply to such things. If Socrates and his interlocutors thought that any correct definition would be like those found in 4-7, this would explain why they thought of self-predication as obvious.[17]

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[14] Nehamas 1979, 93-95. This is quite valuable, but by focusing on proposals introduced with self-predication, Nehamas does not consider the proposals that do not intuitively self-predicate (which I discuss in the next section).
[15] τὸ τὰ ὀφειλόμενα ἑκάστῳ ἀποδιδόναι δίκαιόν ἐστι· (Note that unlike the other sentences, this and the next are direct quotations.)
[16] Ἔστι τοίνυν τὸ μὲν τοῖς θεοῖς προσφιλὲς ὅσιον.
[17] Wolfgang Mann 2000 argues that Aristotle’s *Categories* introduced the modern notion of a thing. One certainly does not need to take such a radical stance to accept what I am saying. But if Mann is even partially correct, it supports the account I develop in this paper.

In fact, not all of the definitions Socrates and his interlocutors provide are similar to those found in 4-7. Examining these other definitions will lead to the real puzzle of self-predication. Before we turn to the proposed definitions that lead to this puzzle, it is worth looking at a few borderline cases:

8. A [certain] sort of endurance of the soul is courageous.[18]
9. A [certain] sort of quietness is temperate.[19]

These substitutions are interesting because the proposed definitions are abstract nouns and so are grammatically similar to claims like "courage is courageous." Both sentences can sound strange to us or perfectly fine. Embedded in ordinary conversation, both would likely sound fine, although taken on their own they can seem quite puzzling. Rather than 8, we would be more likely to say something like "there's a type of endurance that is quite courageous." But if we focus on the question of whether endurance is the sort of thing that can be courageous, 8 may seem to us like a category mistake.

2.2 The Real Puzzle of Self-Predication

Some definitions proposed in the dialogues do not make sense to us when substituted into self-predication claims. For example:

10. The power to accomplish a lot in a small period of time is swift.[20]
11. Knowledge of future goods and evils is courageous.[21]

Power, knowledge, and things like them do not seem to us like the sort of thing that can be swift or courageous. Things that *have* the power to accomplish a lot are swift, but it is strange to think of the power itself as swift. Moreover, Socrates easily moves between proposals that intuitively work in substituted self-predications and those that do not. For example, in the *Charmides* he describes the same proposed definition of temperance as "knowing oneself" (articular infinitive)

[18] Definition of ἀνδρεία: "καρτερία τις τῆς ψυχῆς" *Laches*, 192c.
[19] Definition of σωφροσύνη: "ἡσυχιότης τις" *Charmides*, 159b.
[20] Definition of ταχυτής: "τὴν ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ πολλὰ διαπραττομένην δύναμιν," *Laches* 192b.
[21] Definition of ἀνδρεία: "Τούτων [viz. τὰ μέλλοντα κακά… ἀγαθὰ μέλλοντα] δέ γε τὴν ἐπιστήμην," *Laches* 198c.

and "a sort of knowledge" [of oneself] (165c). Substituted self-predication is much more intuitive in the first case:

12. Knowing oneself is temperate.[22]

13. A sort of knowledge [of oneself] is temperate.[23]

One might think that Plato simply is not careful with his categories. Perhaps he did not notice or care that these are rather different things, despite this mattering for whether self-predication makes sense. If we want to attribute this to him, we could say that he was motivated to accept self-predication on the basis of cases like 4-7 and 12, not noticing or caring about how importantly different these cases are from 10, 11, and 13.

While in some ways Plato may not care about the precise linguistic formulation of answers to what-is-it questions, we should be cautious about relying on that idea here. The reason for caution is that the definitions in the problematic cases, 10, 11, and 13, more closely fit Socrates' general description of forms in the definitional dialogues. In the *Laches* Socrates says that when asking "what is courage?" he is looking for a power (δύναμις) (192b). Powers typically do not work in these substitutions (e.g., 10); rather, it is the thing that has the power that is F. And in the *Euthyphro* and *Meno* Socrates says that a form is what the F-thing *has*:

> Tell me now, by Zeus, what you just now maintained you clearly knew: what kind of thing do you say that the pious and impious are, both as regards murder and other things? Or is the holy itself not the same as itself in every action, and the unholy in turn the opposite of all that is holy, and itself just like itself, and whatever is going to be unholy *has* some one form according to its unholiness? (*Euthyphro*, 5c-d)[24]

> Similarly then also with regard to virtues; even if they are many and of all kinds, at any rate they all *have* some one same form because of which they are virtues (*Meno*, 72c)[25]

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[22] Definition of σωφροσύνη: "τὸ γιγνώσκειν αὐτὸν ἑαυτόν," *Charmides,* 165b.

[23] Definition of σωφροσύνη: "ἐπιστήμη τις," *Charmides,* 165c.

[24] νῦν οὖν πρὸς Διὸς λέγε μοι ὃ νυνδὴ σαφῶς εἰδέναι διισχυρίζου, ποῖόν τι τὸ εὐσεβὲς φῂς εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἀσεβὲς καὶ περὶ φόνου καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων; ἢ οὐ ταὐτόν ἐστιν ἐν πάσῃ πράξει τὸ ὅσιον αὐτὸ αὑτῷ, καὶ τὸ ἀνόσιον αὖ τοῦ μὲν ὁσίου παντὸς ἐναντίον, αὐτὸ δὲ αὑτῷ ὅμοιον καὶ ἔχον μίαν τινὰ ἰδέαν κατὰ τὴν ἀνοσιότητα πᾶν ὅτιπερ ἂν μέλλῃ ἀνόσιον εἶναι;

[25] Οὕτω δὴ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν· κἂν εἰ πολλαὶ καὶ παντοδαπαί εἰσιν, ἕν γέ τι εἶδος ταὐτὸν ἅπασαι ἔχουσιν δι' ὃ εἰσὶν ἀρεταί.

F-things have the form of F-ness.[26] Socrates consistently describes forms in such a way that they fit the definitions in the problematic formulations (10, 11, 13) better than those in the unproblematic ones (4-7 and 12). Given this, it is unlikely that he accepts self-predication because he thinks of forms along the lines of 4-7 and 12. Substituted self-predications do not show us to why Plato thought self-predication was obvious. But they are useful for seeing that self-predication is not obviously absurd; 4-7 and 12 show us how we could think about justice and piety in such a way that self-predication would not be absurd.

More importantly, these substituted self-predications have led us to a puzzle that is more serious than Vlastos'. As we have seen, Socrates is looking for something we have when we are F that explains why we are F. The question is why he (or anyone else) would think that this thing obviously self-predicates. Why think that when an ordinary x is F there is something, F-ness, that (i) explains why x is F, that (ii) x has, and that (iii) itself is obviously F? This is the real puzzle of self-predication. How can we reconcile these basic claims that Plato makes about forms?

It might seem that the puzzle here is still really just (iii), the claim that F-ness is obviously F. But (ii), the claim that x has F-ness, is equally responsible. To see why, suppose that we do not accept (ii) and think of the question "what is courage?" this way: "what is it that is courageous in all these different cases?" This formulation makes self-predication, (iii), quite natural: whatever it is that *is courageous* in all of these different cases must obviously be courageous, since that just is the job description. And this sort of formulation fits well with the proposed definitions where self-predication is intuitive to us (such as are found in 4-7 and 12). Moreover, (iii) is easy to understand along with (i): if you want to know what makes someone courageous, (i), it's what is courageous in all the different cases of courage, (iii). Sentences like 4-7 and 12 show us how to conceive of justice in a way where it is just; F-ness simply needs to pick out an activity or state that is just. The problem is to see how Plato can accept (iii) along with his commitment to (ii): that F-ness is something that F-things *have*. If we start with the idea that courageous people *have* courage, (ii), then 10, 11 and 13 include natural candidates for F-ness, but now it is not obvious why we should think of courage as something that *is courageous* in all of the instances, (iii). It really is the combination of (ii) and (iii) that causes the difficulty.

[26] In the conclusion I discuss how Plato describes the relation between forms and sensible things in the dialogues standardly described as middle period.

It is worth noting, at this point, that the structure of Greek might make it seem natural to think that things like justice self-predicate.[27] You can form an abstract noun in Greek with an article and adjective; for example, "the holy" can be used interchangeably with "holiness." "The holy is holy" or "the just is just" might look to Plato like simple analytic claims. The concern, raised by Vlastos, is that Plato has simply been deceived by the surface syntax of these expressions.[28] If "the holy" is a way to pick out holiness, this alone does not give us good reason to think that it picks out something that is, itself, holy. At the same time, there is also no reason to think that Plato was simply misled by the surface syntax. Perhaps he had a way of thinking of forms as self-predicating that fits with this way of forming the abstract noun in Greek. To figure out why he thinks self-predication is obvious, we need to better understand how he thinks of these entities.

Michael Frede has provided one of the most promising accounts of how Plato thinks of things like justice, which in turn is meant to explain why self-predication is obvious. Frede provides his account in the context of understanding the *Protagoras*; it has been adopted by Constance Meinwald and Wolfgang Mann and applied to other dialogues.[29] According to the account, F-ness is this: what it is about you that is F. Thus, when you are just, justice is what it is about you that is just. All just things have this. On this reading, it is obvious that justice is just: justice simply is what it is about something that *is just*; again, that is simply the job description. Plato is not misled by the surface-syntax of expression like "the holy"; rather, he has an account of holiness that fits well with this syntax.

Unfortunately, Frede's proposal does not help us resolve the real puzzle of self-predication and raises some new questions. It does not resolve the puzzle because it does not explain why *having* is the right relation to bear to what-it-is-about-you-that-is-F. He builds into his proposal (iii), that F-ness is obviously F, but then (ii) is not clear: why do F-things have F-ness? Why would what-it-is-about-you-that-is-F be something that you have? This is the heart of the real puzzle of self-predication: it is not sufficient to find a way in which F-ness could be obviously F, it must also meet the other constraints that Socrates puts on forms. Perhaps if we

[27] So, e.g., Vlastos 1954, 338, and Frede 1992, xxv-xxvi.
[28] Vlastos 1954, 338.
[29] In Frede 1992, xxv, and in a seminar referred to by Meinwald 1991, 15-16, and Mann 2000, 17-18 and 120-124. At the end of Frede 1988 he discusses why self-predication is obvious, but does not provide crucial features of the account described in Frede 1992.

thought about what-it-is-about-you-that-is-F in the right way, we would see why this is something that you have. But it is difficult to understand this phrase: "what it is about you that is F." Take, for example, "what it is about Helen that is beautiful." If someone asked what it is about Helen that is beautiful, you might say her smile, her face, or her hair. But none of these are what we (or Frede) want beauty to be. In particular, it is hard to know how to understand the "about" in the phrase "what it is about you that is F." To the extent that we do not understand this about-relation, it is not clear why anyone would think that when an ordinary thing is F, there is something about it that is F. In sum, Frede's proposal does not help us resolve the real puzzle of self-predication and raises new questions: what does it mean to say that there is something about us that is F and why think that there is such a thing?

3.1 *eidos* and *idea*

In what follows I argue that Plato thinks "justice is just" is obvious because he has an unusual way of thinking about things like justice; this interpretive strategy is quite different from the usual one (discussed in section 4), according to which he has an unusual way of thinking about "is just." The key to understanding how he thinks of things like justice is to consider the terms he uses for them: "*eidos*" and "*idea*," the words we translate "form." When we discuss Plato's forms, the word "form" is often treated as devoid of any meaning, a black box that Plato can describe in any way he wants. Paying attention to Plato's terminology can help us understand the basic way Plato thinks about forms, before he raises metaphysical questions about them in the so-called middle dialogues. These terms are rooted in the notion of an appearance. I argue that Plato's forms self-predicate because they retain some crucial features of appearances, even while being quite different in other respects. It is certainly surprising to think of forms as in any way like an appearance for Plato, given that he frequently contrasts sensible things with forms in the middle dialogues. We will explore this surprising result at the end of the paper. For now, the goal is simply to see how the etymology of "*eidos*" and "*idea*" clarifies why Socrates ascribes to forms the features found in the real puzzle of self-predication.[30]

[30] The etymology of these terms has not received much attention since Ross 1951. However, Fritz-Gregor Herrmann has recently done an important study of the pre-Platonic usage of *eidos* and *idea* in Herrmann 2008, which I draw on here. His overall project and mine are, to some degree, at cross-purposes. He sees Plato's *Phaedo* as the first place that Socrates uses these terms to develop Platonic ideas and so he downplays their importance in dialogues generally thought to come before the *Phaedo*: the *Euthyphro*, *Laches, Gorgias, Meno*, and *Hippias Major*. I think there is a

The semantic range of "*eidos*" and "*idea*" expanded between Homer and Plato in a number of ways relevant for understanding Plato's use of these terms. The meanings and etymologies of the two terms are quite similar; authors before Plato sometimes use them interchangeably. I will focus mostly on "*eidos*" here. Both terms are related to verbs for seeing and knowing, although seeing is more basic: "*idein,*" to see, and "*eidenai,*" "*oida*," to know. Just as "*eidenai*" and "*oida*" came from a root of "to see," similarly, "*eidos*" and "*idea*" began by referring to something-seeable and then started referring to something-knowable. The old meanings in terms of sight remained even as the new meanings emerged.[31]

The range of things that have an *eidos* expands from Homer through the fifth century B.C.E. In Homer it is people, and in one case a dog, that have an *eidos*.[32] In the sixth and early fifth centuries animals and objects are described as having *eidea* and *ideai*. Then, in Thucydides and the late fifth century playwrights *eidos* extends to include actions, decision, events, etc. This semantic expansion is important for Plato's use of "*eidos*": things like justice, holiness, etc., are not naturally thought of as ordinary physical objects such as a dog.

For Homer an *eidos* is sensible and is often contrasted with mental or verbal characteristics. This lovely insult is an example of contrasting a person's *eidos* with his mental characteristics:

> Again, another man resembles the gods as regards his *eidos*,
>
> But for him, no grace is wreathed around his words,
>
> Just as you are very distinguished as regards your *eidos*,
>
> A god could not fit it otherwise; as to reason, however, you are useless. (*Odyssey* 8.174-177)[33]

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sophisticated account in these dialogues. Nonetheless, Herrmann has done valuable work on pre-Platonic usage that is not affected by this disagreement.

[31] Similar shifts have happened with *nous* and *phusis*. See von Fritz 1945 on *nous*, Pauly-Wissowa 1941, 1130-1131, on *phusis*.

[32] When *eidos* occurs in compounds in Homer, it often applies to more than just people; for example ἠεροειδής – misty, cloudy – is applied to the sea. Herrmann 2008 often finds it hard to tell whether these compounds refer merely to something's appearance or to more than just its appearance. The main way that Herrmann determines this is by considering whether non-visual characteristics are included in the *eidos*. But note that if non-visual characteristics are included, that provides evidence of something like an appearance, but with non-visual features: precisely the sort of thing I claim forms are for Plato.

[33] ἄλλος δ' αὖ εἶδος μὲν ἀλίγκιος ἀθανάτοισιν,
ἀλλ' οὔ οἱ χάρις ἀμφὶ περιστέφεται ἐπέεσσιν,
ὡς καὶ σοὶ εἶδος μὲν ἀριπρεπές, οὐδέ κεν ἄλλως
οὐδὲ θεὸς τεύξειε, νόον δ' ἀποφώλιός ἐσσι.

This use of “*eidos*” picks out a person’s visible features. Plato uses “*eidos*” in this older sense to pick out young men’s attractive appearance before asking about their souls or their intelligence (*Lysis* 204e, *Charmides* 154d-e, *Protagoras* 352a). Note also that in Homer an *eidos* can often mislead us. For example:

> Listen, friends: godly Dream came to me as a sleep-vision
> during the ambrosial night: being most like divine Nestor
> in *eidos* and size and growth. (*Iliad* 2.56-58)[34]

Because Dream’s *eidos* is most like Nestor’s, one could easily mistake him for Nestor. Note, then, that the features presented by such a Homeric *eidos* might diverge from the features possessed by the object. It is not that Dream is most like Nestor, period. Dream is most like Nestor with respect his appearance, but in other respects Dream is quite unlike Nestor. In this way such an *eidos* can be misleading. Fritz-Gregor Herrmann argues that there is a slight difference between the terms “*eidos*” and “*idea*” when they are used to pick out a thing’s appearance. “*idea*” is sometimes put alongside a thing’s color; in these cases it seems that it picks out the thing’s shape or figure as opposed to its overall appearance. By contrast, Herrmann does not find any evidence that “*eidos*” ever clearly picks out shape in pre-Platonic authors.[35]

For our purposes, the most important developments of “*eidos*” are in the Hippocratic corpus and Herodotus.[36] As mentioned earlier, in Homer “*eidos*” is used in the singular to refer to a particular person’s appearance. In Herodotus and the Hippocratic authors we find both “*eidos*” and “*idea*” in the plural. But, more importantly, sometimes many things are said to have the same *eidos* or *idea*: different people, animals or objects sharing the same appearance. In this way, they are universals. But we should be careful not to import any substantive views about universals when making this claim; in ordinary language we frequently, unreflectively, say that many things have the same characteristic without importing substantive metaphysical views. Another important development in Herodotus and the Hippocratic corpus is that an *eidos*

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[34] κλῦτε φίλοι· θεῖός μοι ἐνύπνιον ἦλθεν ὄνειρος
ἀμβροσίην διὰ νύκτα· μάλιστα δὲ Νέστορι δίῳ
εἶδός τε μέγεθός τε φυήν τ’ ἄγχιστα ἐῴκει·

[35] This is a major theme of Herrmann 2008 ch. 4.

[36] The bulk of the Hippocratic Corpus is thought to come from the second half of the fifth century and first half of the fourth (see Nutton 2013, 61). I rely on *Epidemics* III and *Airs, Waters, and Places* below, both of which are thought to come from the second half of the fifth century (see Nutton 2013, 60 and 342 n. 36, and Jouanna 1999, 375 and 388).

sometimes encompasses characteristics that are not visible, such as being manly, hot, or feverish. These developments often make "type" the best translation, or perhaps "species," although the terms do not have the biological connotation of "species." For example:

> But also many other *eidea* of fevers were epidemic: tertians, quartans, [fevers] nocturnal, continuous, protracted, irregular, attended by nausea, and unstable.[37] (*Epidemics* 3.12)

These types of fevers were epidemic, not their appearances. Note that these *eidea* are not the sort of thing that can be misleading, as Dream's *eidos* is; if you discern that something has one of these *eidea*, then you can be confident that it has a fever. As is generally the case with types, these *eidea* are naturally understood as being explanatory, in the sense that things are a certain way because of the *eidos* (the sort of relation picked out by *dia* + acc.). It is because these people have an irregular fever that they act the way they do, whereas those people behave differently because their fever is protracted. While "type" is the most natural translation, it is important to see that this is a fairly natural extension of the earlier use of "*eidos*": the main reason "appearance" is no longer a reasonable translation is that it is not limited to visual features. There is no reason to think that the logical structure of *eidos* completely shifts when it involves more than just visible characteristics. For understanding self-predication it is important to see how similar appearances can be to types. We should think of this sort of *eidos* and *idea* as like a shared appearance, but encompassing more than visual characteristics and explanatorily prior, in the sense just described.[38]

In fact, there are a number of cases where it is unclear whether "*eidos*" means appearance or something more like type or species. For example Herodotus says, when discussing giant ants in India:

[37] Πολλὰ δὲ καὶ ἄλλα πυρετῶν ἐπεδήμησεν εἴδεα, τριταίων, τεταρταίων, νυκτερινῶν, ξυνεχέων, μακρῶν, πεπλανημένων, ἀσωδέων, ἀκαταστάτων.

[38] *eidos* is sometimes used in Hippocratic texts to pick out the thing that has an appearance, rather than the appearance itself. For example:

> It is also probable that dysenteries occur, both with the women and with the moistest *eidea*.
> Καὶ δυσεντερίας εἰκός ἐστι γίγνεσθαι καὶ τῇσι γυναιξὶ καὶ τοῖσιν εἴδεσι τοῖσιν ὑγροτάτοισιν. (*Airs, Waters, and Places* 10)

It is people that are referred to here with *eidos*; they have dysenteries, rather than their appearance or species. Perhaps this sort of usage is important precursor to the way that forms are ontologically independent for Plato. The forms in this case are not the forms *of* anything else.

> Now these ants, in building their dwellings, carry up sand from under the earth, in the same way as with the ants among the Greeks; they are, in fact, most similar with respect to their *eidos*.[39] (3.102)

Herodotus could be saying that the ants both act the same and, in fact, are most similar as far as their type/species is concerned. In this case, the point of mentioning the *eidos* would be that not only do they share behavior, but this is in fact part of a larger similarity (in species), which explains why they behave similarly. But "*eidos*" could also mean "appearance," in which case the point would be that it is not surprising that they act similarly, since they look similar. In this case, the *eidos* would not explain the behavior, but simply be a further way in which they are similar. It can often be hard to tell whether to translate "type" or "appearance."[40] There is no reason to think that the authors or audience thought of these as distinct uses of the terms. And, even if they did think of "*eidos*" as having distinct uses, we need not suppose that they thought of one of these uses the same way that we think about types.

In this example of the ants in Herodotus, not only does it seem possible to translate "*eidos*" as something like type, it also seems like it could mean something like nature: these giant ants are most similar to Greek ones with respect to their nature. While "type" is a more natural translation of "*eidos*" when it is found along with a genus in the genitive ("types *of fever* are epidemic"), "nature" often works when there is no genitive (although it is best to reserve "nature" as a translation of "*phusis*"). But again, as with types, we need to be careful not to assume that these authors are thinking of natures as we do.

A crucial development for self-predication is the use of "*eidos*" as the subject of a sentence, with things predicated of it. In Homer, "*eidos*" is typically used as an accusative of respect and so adverbially. There is one attested case with "*eidos*" as a subject in Hesiod.[41] But the most important examples come later, where an *eidos* functions quite similarly to a Platonic form. Consider this case from the Hippocratic *Airs, Waters, and Places*:

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[39] Οὗτοι ὦν οἱ μύρμηκες ποιεύμενοι οἴκησιν ὑπὸ γῆν ἀναφέρουσι [τὴν] ψάμμον κατά περ οἱ ἐν τοῖσι Ἕλλησι μύρμηκες κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον, εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ τὸ εἶδος ὁμοιότατοι.

[40] One might think, in favor of the first reading, that since he has already called them ants, it would be redundant to say that they look quite similar; in general one assumes that different types of ants look similar, unless given reason to think otherwise. In favor of the second reading, "εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ" would normally be more likely to be an additional point ("they are also"), rather than what explains the previous point. If one finds either of these considerations decisive, then other examples are not hard to find; see Herrmann chapter 4.

[41] *Fr*. 43a (M-W), 74.

All those who inhabit a mountainous, rough, high, well-watered country, where the changes of seasons are great for them – there it is fitting that *eidea* are tall and naturally tend to the hard-working and the manly, and these sort of natures have the wild and the brutish to no small degree. (Section 24)[42]

Note that the *eidea* themselves are tall and naturally tend to the hard-working and manly. They are also naturally taken to be the same as the "natures," since they are the most immediate possible reference for "these sort of natures" and this allows the sentence to describe the same thing (the forms/natures) both as (1) tall, hard-working, and manly and as (2) to no small degree wild or brutish. The passage comes at the end of *Airs, Waters, and Places*, where the author is summarizing the basic differences between different sorts of people. He does this by describing their natures or *eidea*; in doing so, he takes himself to be explaining how the people are. In other words, the predicates that apply to people's *eidea* are used to explain the predicates that apply to the people. Thus, the logical structure is the same as is found in Plato's forms: the *eidos* is tall and because it is tall, the thing that has the *eidos* (the person) is tall.

Whereas "*eidos*" is more prominent than "*idea*" in the Hippocratic treatises, "*idea*" plays an important role in Presocratic philosophers' cosmologies. Most importantly, "*idea*" was used by Anaxagoras and Democritus to refer to fundamental features of the cosmos: the shapes of the seeds for Anaxagoras (DK 59B4), and atoms for Democritus. Plutarch ascribes to Democritus this view:

All things are atomic *ideai*, as he calls them, and there is nothing else. (DK 68A57)[43]

It is unclear whether to put the comma before "*ideai*" instead of after, in which case it would be translated "all things are atoms, which he calls *ideai*, and there is nothing else." On either reading, Democritus calls these *ideai*; on one reading, he specifies that they are indivisible (atomic) *ideai*. Recall that "*idea*" sometimes refers to a thing's shape or figure, in particular. Since a thing's figure could be seen as its fundamental characteristic, we can understand why Democritus would have referred to them as figures (*ideai*). The important point, for our

[42] Ὁκόσοι μὲν χώρην ὀρεινήν τε οἰκέουσι καὶ τρηχείην καὶ ὑψηλὴν καὶ ἔνυδρον, καὶ αἱ μεταβολαὶ αὐτέοισι γίγνονται τῶν ὡρέων μέγα διάφοροι, ἐνταῦθα εἰκὸς εἴδεα μεγάλα εἶναι, καὶ πρὸς τὸ ταλαίπωρον καὶ τὸ ἀνδρεῖον εὖ πεφυκότα· καὶ τό τε ἄγριον καὶ τὸ θηριῶδες αἱ τοιαῦται φύσιες οὐχ ἥκιστα ἔχουσιν·

[43] εἶναι δὲ πάντα τὰς ἀτόμους ἰδέας, ὑπ' αὐτοῦ καλουμένας, ἕτερον δὲ μηδέν.

purposes, is that a philosopher active before Plato made *ideai* the most fundamental thing in his account of reality.

3.2 Forms as Similar to Types, Natures, and Appearances

The passage from *Airs, Waters, and Places* shows us that before Plato there was a way of thinking about forms where they are very different from universals as Vlastos describes them. Why would the author of *Airs, Waters, and Places* describe the *eidos* as tall or as tending toward the hard working? It is strange for us to think of someone's nature or type is tall. Plato's usage naturally emerges out of to *eidos* and *idea*'s original meaning as figure or appearance. We can speak of someone's figure is tall, just as we can say that someone's appearance is handsome. In these cases, not only does the person have a tall figure and a handsome appearance, the person is tall and handsome, if the appearance is not misleading. When a visual feature is applied to a figure or appearance, that feature applies to the thing that has the figure or appearance, as long as the appearance is not misleading. (If the appearance is misleading, then predicates that apply to the appearance may not apply to the person.) This, in fact, brings us very close to the logical structure of forms, as described in the real puzzle of self-predication. Recall that the problem is to explain why Plato thinks that when an ordinary x is F there is something, F-ness, (i) that explains why x is F, (ii) that x has, and (iii) that itself is obviously F. A figure or appearance is something that we have, and if it has some visual feature, we have this same feature (if the appearance is not misleading). Moreover, while a person has an appearance, it is not the case that he or she *is* this appearance. Thus, appearances combine features (ii) and (iii), the two conditions we had trouble reconciling.

To be clear: for Plato forms are in most ways importantly different from appearances. Well before Plato, *eidos* and *idea* expanded their semantic range, so that they were not limited to visual characteristics, were not misleading, and were explanatorily prior – key features of forms that differentiate them from appearances. These were not innovative features of forms in the so-called early and transitional dialogues, which is why Socrates does not act as if he is saying anything surprising there. For purposes of resolving the real puzzle of self-predication, the key is that forms are like appearances except they encompass more than just visual characteristics and

meet condition (i) in the real puzzle of self-predication: F-ness explains why an F thing is F.[44] The form is the being (οὐσία) that F-things have. By contrast, we sometimes, but not always, treat appearances as explained by some more fundamental features. One shirt might appear blue because it is blue; its being blue explains why it appears that way. Another shirt might appear blue because there is a blue light shining on a white shirt – a different explanation for the same appearance.[45]

In Greek, as in English, we talk about appearances in quite different ways. Sometimes we talk about a particular person or thing's overall appearance. We saw this sort of usage in Homer. In these cases we can apply a number of different predicates to the appearance, for example, tall, ungainly, and pale. But, with Herodotus, for example, we can also say that Eastern and Western Ethiopians have the same appearance, the same *eidos* (*Histories* 7.70). Such an appearance has a more limited number of predicates that apply to it: only those that hold in general among Ethiopians. We can also say that a number of different things have a beautiful appearance where the only thing that these things share is being beautiful; such an appearance is only characterized by a single property. Justice and piety, for Plato, are like this sort of appearance: picked out in terms of a single characteristic that defines them.[46]

Plato had a category that we do not have: something like a mix of nature, type, and appearance, which sustained self-predication. For us, courage is not courageous. Plato thinks of things like holiness, etc., as having some features of appearances that we do not ascribe to them.

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[44] This account might seem open to the Third Man regress from the *Parmenides*, which Aristotle thought was especially problematic. The problem arises because in order to explain why F-ness itself is F, it seems that there must be something else that is F to explain this. In fact, nothing we have seen so far about forms requires this non-identity condition: that something other than the original F-ness must explain why F-ness is F. There is only a regress if there must be some new F-ness that explains why the old one is F. In fact, I think that for Plato forms explain their own being F, which is why he says that they are themselves according to themselves (αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτό). But this is not the place to discuss the Third Man argument. This paper is focused on why Plato accepted self-predication in the first place. The fact is that Plato's account does seem like it might be open to a regress problem, which is why he raises the issue in the *Parmenides* and why Aristotle thought it was a serious problem. An account of self-predication should be able to explain why the Third Man at least apparently poses a problem.

[45] Sometimes we do not treat appearances as the sort of thing that could be misleading, but rather we treat a thing's appearance as the visible features it actually has, which in turn explains why it looks to us the way it does. We can describe a plant's appearance as green and say that it looks green in normal daylight because it has this appearance. In this way we often treat appearances as explanatorily prior, like Plato's forms. Of course, Plato's forms are still different from appearances because they encompass more than the visual features of a thing.

[46] In the middle period dialogues we are told that all forms have certain features, such as being one, eternal, unchanging, etc. Santas 1980 calls these ideal attributes (following Keyt on Aristotle). These sorts of properties raise some tricky issues for Plato, issues which he addresses, e.g., in the *Republic*, *Parmenides*, and *Sophist*. It is beyond the scope of the paper to address them here.

However, there are some suggestions of this way of thinking in our ordinary expressions. For example, we say that someone is the very embodiment of courage. Courage is the sort of thing that you can embody, in which case you have all of courage's core features.[47]

One might want to refer to forms as "aspects,"[48] which is etymologically connected to "species" and thus to *eidos* and *idea*. One advantage of "aspect" is that it no longer has purely visual connotations in English, just as *eidos* and *idea* did not. On the other hand, we should be careful not to lose sight of the visual origins of these terms, which easily can happen with the term "aspect." Another disadvantage of "aspect" is that it typically indicates one way of picking out a thing, from a particular perspective – one angle on an object. Moreover, aspects are not ontologically independent of what they are aspects of, in the sense that aspects do not exist independently of what they are aspects of. In the *Symposium*, *Phaedo*, and *Republic* Plato treats forms as ontologically independent, in this sense. There is no reason to think, in doing so, that he is undermining the basic meaning of the term, as he would be if the term meant "aspect."

Throughout the dialogues Socrates frequently uses visual terms for our cognition of forms: we can gaze upon them or look at them (e.g., ἀποβλέπω: *Euthyphro* 6e, *Meno* 72c-d, *Gorgias* 503d-e; καθοράω, θεάομαι: *Symposium* 210d-211d). This is particularly appropriate since forms are like appearances, and the terms for forms are themselves visual in origin. In the *Euthyphro* Socrates uses visual language when discussing forms as models (παραδείγματα):

> Socrates: Tell me then what this form itself is, so that I may look upon it (ἀποβλέπων) and, using it as a model, say that any action of yours or another's that is of that sort is holy, and if it is not that it is not.[49] (*Euthyphro* 6e)

You can use the form as a model for judging because, just like a model, it has all of the characteristics against which you can judge whether or not something is holy. You can judge your constructed house by seeing whether the features of the model match those of the

[47] Note that this way of thinking about F-ness fits nicely with using the phrase "the F" to pick out F-ness. Justice is just and it is referred to as "the just."
[48] So Sandra Peterson 2008, 385 (see especially n. 2).
[49] Ταύτην τοίνυν με αὐτὴν δίδαξον τὴν ἰδέαν τίς ποτέ ἐστιν, ἵνα εἰς ἐκείνην ἀποβλέπων καὶ χρώμενος αὐτῇ παραδείγματι, ὃ μὲν ἂν τοιοῦτον ᾖ ὧν ἂν ἢ σὺ ἢ ἄλλος τις πράττῃ φῶ ὅσιον εἶναι, ὃ δ' ἂν μὴ τοιοῦτον, μὴ φῶ.

construction. Similarly, the form of holiness can be used as a model because it is holy, and so you can judge whether something is holy by comparing it to the form.[50]

It is natural for us, at this point, to raise a number of metaphysical questions about forms when understood in this way. For example, what type of thing is a form? How do forms relate to ordinary objects? How can multiple things have the same form? Plato takes up these questions, among many others, in his dialogues. He did not take the answers to be obvious simply from the basic notion of an *eidos*. The goal of this paper is simply to describe the basic concept that Plato starts with before he raises such questions, the basic concept that made self-predication obvious.

The account I have offered is importantly different from traditional self-exemplification views. John Malcolm defends such a view as an account of middle-period forms.[51] On his view, forms are, as he says, "F things." They are F in the same way that other things are F – except that perhaps they are F more perfectly or fully. For Malcolm, forms are perfect exemplars, instantiating whatever property they exemplify; they are a type of ideal object. Forms as I have described them, by contrast, need not be exemplars or objects any more than "parachuting" needs to be an object for us to say that it is dangerous. To take another example, if you and I each have the height 5'10", then we each are 5'10" and we are so because we have this height. And this height is 5'10" if anything is. But that does not commit us to some separate object that perfectly exemplifies 5'10" – one would need some additional arguments to reach this conclusion. There is a liberal use of the term "thing" according to which we can say that "one *thing* we could do this weekend is go parachuting." As long as we are using this liberal notion of a thing, there is nothing wrong with thinking of forms as things. The problems arise when we think of them as analogous to ordinary, sensible objects.

In fact, in the dialogues that Malcolm says his theory helps us understand, the middle-period dialogues, Socrates takes pains to show how different forms are from ordinary, sensible things. It is incredibly difficult to think of the form of largeness as some object whose only basic feature is that it is unsurpassably large. Happily, Socrates need not think of the form of largeness as an ideal object. Instead, it is characterized by a single feature, just like the appearance of being

[50] For a fuller discussion of forms as paradigms, see Dancy 2004, ch. 5.
[51] Malcolm 1991.

large.[52] No object can appear large without having other, irrelevant features. But the appearance of being large, itself, does not have these other features. This said, it is important to remember that on this account forms need not be contrasted with sensible things; we can understand self-predication without it. This is important because Socrates does not draw this contrast in the *Protagoras*, *Hippias Major*, or *Euthydemus*.

Because this is not meant as an account of the metaphysical underpinnings of self-predication, many other accounts of self-predication are compatible with viewing forms as in this respect like an appearance. For example, consider the idea that forms self-predicate because causes must possess whatever they cause: like causes like.[53] In the *Hippias Major* and *Phaedo* Socrates refers to the form of F-ness as the cause of things being F. If Plato combined this with the idea that like causes like, then the form of F-ness must itself be F so it can cause things to be F. While this may be a view that Plato embraces, there is no reason to think that it is why Plato thought self-predication was obvious in the first place. It could just as easily be the other way around: because forms self-predicate and because like causes like, forms are clear candidates for being causes. Perhaps Plato thought that his causal theory sheds light on the ultimate explanation for forms self-predicating. But it does not tell us why he thought self-predication was obvious in the first place.[54]

Similarly, David Furley has noted that forms in the *Phaedo* are similar to Anaxagorean cosmic stuffs.[55] Just as cosmic heat is hot, and everything is hot (for Anaxagoras) to the extent that it has a share of cosmic heat, so (in the *Phaedo*) the form of heat is hot, and everything is hot to the extent that it has a share of the form of heat. Here, again, we can see self-predication as

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[52] I take it that in the *Phaedo* and *Symposium* Socrates picks out this feature by saying that a form is μονοειδές (78d, 211b), unlike a sensible thing, which is πολυειδές (80b). Socrates may also be picking this out with his use of "αὐτὸ τὸ F": the F itself. This thing is only F, nothing else. He refers to forms this way right after using the terms "*eidos*" and "*idea*" in the *Euthyphro* (5d) and *Hippias Major* (289d), as well as in middle period dialogues such as the *Phaedo* (e.g., 74c).
[53] E.g., Teloh 1975, Bostock 1986, Sedley 1998.
[54] Across the dialogues Socrates holds that it is by F-ness (causal dative) that something is F, including in the *Protagoras*, *Hippias Major*, and *Euthydemus*. Could it be, then, that this principle was behind his acceptance of self-predication in earlier dialogues, although he did not use the term "cause" (αἰτία)? The problem is that Socrates and his interlocutors find self-predication obvious without having to argue for it in this way. They never seem to reason that F-ness must be F since it is by F-ness that thing are F and since like causes like. In any event, this causal role of forms is among the many things that fit nicely with self-predication (such as the use of the phrase "the F" for F-ness). Perhaps it is among the many features of forms that added to the sense that self-predication is obvious.
[55] See Furley 1976 and Furley 2002.

what allows Plato to give forms a similar role to Anaxagoras' cosmic stuffs, rather than the similar role being what motivates self-predication.[56]

This account might seem to make Platonic forms metaphysically extravagant. Why would Plato think he could take for granted the existence of such things? First, there is no reason to think that our current conception of the things picked out by abstract nouns was the obvious one at the time and that Plato's would be viewed as extravagant. (In fact, it is not clear whether we all today share a basic concept of the sort of thing picked out by these nouns.) There was an important precedent for Plato's way of thinking and, as mentioned earlier, his intellectual environment was quite different from ours. He did not have our twenty-five hundred year tradition of reflecting on such things.

But, more importantly, Plato does not simply take for granted the existence of such entities. Across the dialogues, including the *Euthyphro*, *Protagoras*, *Cratylus*, *Phaedo*, and *Republic*, Socrates makes a point of getting his interlocutors to agree to the existence of forms (and in the *Parmenides* he tries to get them to agree, but fails). In the initial description of the forms in *Euthyphro*, which we looked at earlier, Socrates asks Euthyphro whether he believes the form exists, "or is the holy itself not the same as itself in every action…?" (5d). In the *Protagoras* Socrates asks Protagoras whether or not he thinks that justice is something (πρᾶγμα, 330c). In the *Cratylus* Socrates says that he dreams about whether there is a beautiful itself and a good itself and the same for each of the things that are (439c). In the *Phaedo* Socrates repeatedly makes the point that his arguments rely on there being forms (e.g., 65d, 76d). He even develops a new manner of investigating, one that begins from hypotheses, and then makes the existence of forms the hypothesis for his new account of causation (99d-102a). Far from presupposing the

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[56] One might wonder how, on this account, to understand the troublesome substituted self-predications that we considered earlier (section 2.2). Viewing forms in the way I suggest tells us why Plato would think of self-predication is obvious given his basic notion of a form. It is not motivated bottom up from how definitions work in substituted self-predications. It is perhaps, then, not surprising that thinking of forms as in some ways like appearances does not suddenly make intuitive the troublesome substituted self-predications. Consider again these cases:

10. The power to accomplish a lot in a small period of time is swift.
11. Knowledge of future goods and evils is courageous.

Would Plato have been happy to think these might be true? It is not clear. For us, predicates like "swift" and "courageous" can apply to certain non-objects, like activities and states, but we find it strange to think of them as applying to powers and knowledge. Plato thought of them differently so he may have been fine with sentences like 10 and 11. If he did not accept them, he would face a tension between his acceptance of self-predication and his acceptance of a definition such as is found in 10, which picks out a power. If swiftness is swift, and swiftness is a power, then this power should be swift.

existence of forms, Plato repeatedly highlights it as an assumption. And in the *Republic* Socrates argues against those lovers of sights and sounds who deny that there are forms (475d ff.). In fact, Plato has a cautious approach. He thinks it is obvious that if there are forms, then they self-predicate. But he does not think it is obvious that there are forms. Of course, this does not mean that Plato's way of thinking about such things is superior to our own, but it would take an argument to establish which, if either, is better.

This still leaves us wondering whether Plato made a mistake in accepting this hypothesis that there are things like justice, piety, etc. that self-predicate. While I think this is a deeply alien way of thinking, I do not think it is clear that it is a mistake. It is true that Plato is led to radical results that I think, and most of us think, are mistaken. He reaches these results from combining self-predication with further views about forms and sensible things, especially in the *Phaedo*, *Republic*, and *Symposium*. But these radical results derive from a number of his commitments coming together. If any particular culprit is to be singled out, I think the real culprit is his views about the nature of sensible things, not self-predication.

4. Univocal, Ordinary Predication

The account I have offered explains the strangeness of self-predication in terms of Plato's alien way of conceiving of things like justice. In this section I draw out an important advantage of doing this: it allows us to avoid problems that arise when interpreters posit a new meaning of "is" or "just" in the claim "justice is just." One could both accept that Plato has this alien way of conceiving of justice and also posit a new meaning for "is" or "just," but this unnecessary and would lead to the problems described in this section.

Alexander Nehamas has developed the most popular interpretation that provides a new meaning to "is just"; many others have developed similar ideas.[57] According to Nehamas, "Justice is just" means: Justice is what it is to be just. Once we understand self-predication this way, we need an account of non-self-predication claims. When I say that a city is just, am I claiming that it is what it is to be just? According to Nehamas I am, which is why Socrates thinks

[57] See, e.g., Nehamas 1975 and 1979. For broadly similar views, see, for example, Crombie 1963, Gosling 1965, Woodruff 1982, Patterson 1985, Penner 1987, and Silverman 2002. Other, rather different, views have been developed, e.g., Allen 1960 and Peterson 1973. For recent criticisms of many of these views, see Wolfsdorf 2002.

that things in the sensible world are imperfect; the F-things fail to be what-it-is-to-be-F.[58] However, most other scholars who offer a special meaning of "is" or "just" do not take this approach; instead, they think that "is just" has importantly different meanings or uses, one for the case of self-predications and another for the case of normal predications.[59] I will take up Nehamas' position first and then turn to such ambiguity views.

Both Nehamas' view and ambiguity views are motivated by the need to make sense of self-predication. Socrates seems to be saying that justice has the characteristic picked out by "just," but this seems too absurd a view for Plato to accept. Once we view him as having an alien notion of things like justice, we no longer need a novel interpretation of what Plato really means; we can attribute to him what he seems to be saying, without his making a simple conceptual mistake.

Nehamas' view faces serious difficulties in making sense of the so-called early and transitional dialogues. As Nehamas himself emphasizes, Socrates makes self-predication claims in these dialogues. But Socrates frequently says that particular sensible things are F, without qualifying or modifying this claim. On Nehamas' view this would be a huge conceptual error on Socrates' part, because he would be saying that these sensible things are what-it-is-to-be-F. Plato does not merely make such predications in the early and middle dialogues, he makes them in close vicinity to describing forms and claiming that they self-predicate. For example, Socrates happily says that prosecuting the wrongdoer may be holy even while denying that it is what it is to be holy (*Euthyphro* 6d). Similarly, he happily admits that a figwood spoon is finer than a golden one (*Hippias Major*, 291c), even though a figwood spoon is no more the definition of the fine than a golden spoon is.

Let us turn, then, to the accounts of self-predication on which "is F" is ambiguous. On such an account, Plato treats "is just" in "justice is just" and in "this city is just" as meaning different things (it does not matter for our purposes whether this difference comes from the "is", the "just", or the whole phrase "is just"). It is important to realize that these accounts are not claiming that there are simply multiple ways to be just. Here are two different ways to be just:

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[58] Nehamas 1975, 108-109, and 1979, 96-97.

[59] Frede insists that he is not providing a new meaning, just a new use. To avoid cumbersome expressions, I will simply refer to this sort of view as one where there are multiple meanings. Meinwald 1992, developing a Frede-like view, is happy to call them different types of predication (378 ff.). These views make the different types of "is just" robustly different, so that their views face the same problems that face accounts that posit different meanings.

sometimes punishing is just and other times compensating is just. But we need not think "is just" means something different depending on how you do it. Similarly, parachuting is dangerous in a different way from how Sally is dangerous, but that does not automatically mean that "is" or "dangerous" have different meanings in these cases. Perhaps they do, but that would require an argument to establish.

Ambiguity views face serious problems explaining how Socrates puts self-predication to use in the dialogues.[60] Scholars frequently treat self-predication as a puzzle in its own right and then develop an account that tries to make sense of it on its own. But we need to ensure that our account not only makes sense of these claims on their own, but also how Plato uses them in his arguments. An important example is in the *Protagoras*. The passage arises in Socrates' first argument for the unity of virtue:

> "Suppose someone asked both you and me, 'Protagoras and Socrates, tell me, this thing you just named, justice, is this itself just or unjust?' I myself would answer that it is just. How would you cast your vote? The same as mine or different?"
>
> "The same."
>
> Then I would answer, 'Justice is the sort of thing that is just.' Would you?
>
> "Yes"
>
> …
>
> "'Do you say that this thing [holiness] is naturally the sort of thing to be unholy or holy?' Myself, I would be irritated with the question and would say, 'Quiet, man! Hardly another thing would be holy if holiness itself is not holy.' What about you? Wouldn't you answer in this way?"
>
> "Absolutely"
>
> …
>
> "Protagoras, once we have agreed to this, how shall we answer his next question? 'Then is holiness not the sort of thing that is just, and justice not the sort that is holy, but rather the sort that is not holy? Is holiness the sort of thing that is not just, and therefore unjust, and justice unholy?' What are we going to say to him? Personally, I would answer both that justice is holy and holiness is just, and I would give the same answer on your behalf,

[60] For other arguments against non-univocal accounts, see Malcolm 1991 ch. 6.

> if you would let me, that justice is the same thing as holiness, or most similar, and most emphatically, that justice is the same sort of thing as holiness, and holiness as justice...."
> "It does not seem so simple to me, Socrates, as to make me grant that justice is holy, and holiness just, but there seems to me that there is a difference here."
> (330c-331c)[61]

If we view justice and holiness as straightforwardly just and pious, we can read this argument in a very natural way. Socrates claims that justice and holiness are each the sort of thing to be just and to be holy, and hence that it is reasonable to think that they are the same or most similar. Protagoras is not convinced that justice is the sort of thing to be holy and holiness just, and hence does now draw the conclusion.[62]

Recall that on the ambiguity views we are considering "holiness is holy" means "holiness is what it is to be holy." However, "justice is holy" can mean either (a) "justice is what it is to be holy" or (b)"justice is holy" in the ordinary sense of "is holy." If it means (b), then the argument will equivocate. If "is holy" means one thing when applied to holiness and another thing in other cases, Socrates would be making quite a jump when he nonchalantly claims that because (1) justice is holy and (2) holiness is holy, justice and holiness are "the same or similar." He would

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[61] Τί οὖν; εἴ τις ἔροιτο ἐμέ τε καὶ σέ· "Ὦ Πρωταγόρα τε καὶ Σώκρατες, εἴπετον δή μοι, τοῦτο τὸ πρᾶγμα ὃ ὠνομάσατε ἄρτι, ἡ δικαιοσύνη, αὐτὸ τοῦτο δίκαιόν ἐστιν ἢ ἄδικον;" ἐγὼ μὲν ἂν αὐτῷ ἀποκριναίμην ὅτι δίκαιον· σὺ δὲ τίν' ἂν ψῆφον θεῖο; τὴν αὐτὴν ἐμοὶ ἢ ἄλλην; — Τὴν αὐτήν, ἔφη. — Ἔστιν ἄρα τοιοῦτον ἡ δικαιοσύνη οἷον δίκαιον εἶναι, φαίην ἂν ἔγωγε ἀποκρινόμενος τῷ ἐρωτῶντι· οὐκοῦν καὶ σύ; — Ναί, ἔφη…"Πότερον δὲ τοῦτο αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμά φατε τοιοῦτον πεφυκέναι οἷον ἀνόσιον εἶναι ἢ οἷον ὅσιον;" ἀγανακτήσαιμ' ἂν ἔγωγ', ἔφην, τῷ ἐρωτήματι, καὶ εἴποιμ' ἄν· Εὐφήμει, ὦ ἄνθρωπε· σχολῇ μεντἄν τι ἄλλο ὅσιον εἴη, εἰ μὴ αὐτή γε ἡ ὁσιότης ὅσιον ἔσται. τί δὲ σύ; οὐχ οὕτως ἂν ἀποκρίναιο; … Τί οὖν, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, ἀποκρινούμεθα αὐτῷ, ταῦτα ὁμολογήσαντες, ἐὰν ἡμᾶς ἐπανέρηται· "Οὐκ ἄρα ἐστὶν ὁσιότης οἷον δίκαιον εἶναι πρᾶγμα, οὐδὲ δικαιοσύνη οἷον ὅσιον ἀλλ' οἷον μὴ ὅσιον· ἡ δ' ὁσιότης οἷον μὴ δίκαιον, ἀλλ' ἄδικον ἄρα, τὸ δὲ ἀνόσιον;" τί αὐτῷ ἀποκρινούμεθα; ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸς ὑπέρ γε ἐμαυτοῦ φαίην ἂν καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην ὅσιον εἶναι καὶ τὴν ὁσιότητα δίκαιον· καὶ ὑπὲρ σοῦ δέ, εἴ με ἐῴης, ταὐτὰ ἂν ταῦτα ἀποκρινοίμην, ὅτι ἤτοι ταὐτόν γ' ἐστιν δικαιότης ὁσιότητι ἢ ὅτι ὁμοιότατον, καὶ μάλιστα πάντων ἥ τε δικαιοσύνη οἷον ὁσιότης καὶ ἡ ὁσιότης οἷον δικαιοσύνη….Οὐ πάνυ μοι δοκεῖ, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὕτως ἁπλοῦν εἶναι, ὥστε συγχωρῆσαι τήν τε δικαιοσύνην ὅσιον εἶναι καὶ τὴν ὁσιότητα δίκαιον, ἀλλά τί μοι δοκεῖ ἐν αὐτῷ διάφορον εἶναι.

[62] Why does Socrates think his conclusion follows? Normally, if two things share two features, that is not sufficient for concluding that they are the same or most similar. There are at least two reasons that Socrates proceeds as he does. First, he is trying to determine how great his disagreement is with Protagoras. If Protagoras had accepted that holiness is just and justice holy, but denied that they are most similar, that would have steered the discussion in a certain direction. Instead, Protagoras questions whether they even have these features, so there is no reason for Socrates to fill in his reasoning. As for how he would fill in the reasoning, the important point is that justice and holiness do not merely happen to be just and holy; according to Socrates they are each the sort of thing that is just and holy. We can think of it this way: Socrates is saying that these features are part of the very nature of justice and holiness. If these crucial features are part of each of their natures, it is reasonable to expect them to be the same or at least most similar.

need to tell us why we can conclude that they are the same or similar if one of them is holy and the other what-it-is-to-be holy. In general, there is no reason to think something that is F is the same as or similar to something that is what-it-is-to-be-F. Suppose that a certain beach ball is red and that what it is to be red is to reflect a certain spectrum of light. We cannot conclude from this that the beach ball is the same or similar to reflecting a certain spectrum of light.[63] Perhaps Socrates is baldly equivocating in this argument, without Protagoras noticing, but we only are driven to that conclusion if we are in the grips of the ambiguity theory. Again, the natural way to read the argument is that justice and holiness are the sort of things that share two crucial characteristics, so they are the same or most similar.

Let us suppose instead that in the argument "is holy" means the same thing throughout the passage, namely "what it is to be holy." This is how Nehamas would read the passage and ambiguity interpretations can read it this way too. One problem with such a reading is that Socrates would be assuming precisely what he is arguing for. When Socrates asks whether "justice is holy," he would be asking whether "justice is what it is to be holy," which is (for such views) to ask whether "justice is holiness."[64] Protagoras is an astute interlocutor, willing to push back against Socrates, yet he does not accuse Socrates of blatantly assuming what he is trying to prove. Moreover, if we understand "is holy" as "is what it is to be holy," we cannot explain the structure of the argument. Socrates does not think he can conclude that justice is the same as holiness, even if Protagoras agrees that "justice is holy." Yet he should be able to conclude this on any account that gives a Nehamas-style reading of this phrase. Instead Socrates says that we should conclude that justice and holiness are "the same or most similar." Any interpretation that wants to give a Nehamas-style readings of this passage would have to do some very creative work to avoid interpreting Socrates as assuming his conclusion and then adding "or most similar" for no reason. Again, the account I have offered of self-predication allows for a natural and straightforward reading, using ordinary predication.

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[63] Moreover, there would be no need for the ambiguity view in the first place if we could conclude from "justice is holy" and "holiness is what it is to be holy" that justice and holiness are the same or similar. The ambiguity view is motivated by the idea that it is very different to say that x is F and that x is what-it-is-to-be F. Distinguishing them is supposed to make sense of both self-predications and ordinary predications. If things that share these predicates are "the same or most similar," then why posit an ambiguity in the first place?

[64] Peterson 1973, n. 16 on 460, notes this sort of problem.

While someone might argue that "is just" means something different in "returning what one owes is just" and "that city is just," it is not crazy to treat them as meaning the same thing; they are not like "bank" as a financial institution and as the side of a river. Similarly, when someone says that 7'1" is tall, and that Matt is tall, and that Matt has a tall figure, it is reasonable to treat "tall" and "is tall" as meaning the same thing. Given the way that Socrates argues, he must think that "is F" does not have a different meaning in self-predications.

5. Conclusion

I have argued that it is not a simple category mistake to think that justice is just; whether it is a mistake depends on how one thinks of justice. In order to understand how Plato thought of things like justice, I raised the real puzzle of self-predication: why think that when an ordinary x is F there is something, F-ness, (i) that explains why x is F, (ii) that x has, and (iii) that itself is F? We can resolve the problem and understand why self-predication is obvious if we think of forms as like an appearance in an important way – a strange idea to us, but a natural one given the etymology of *eidos* and *idea*. This conception of forms has advantages over the traditional view of forms as perfect exemplars and over Nehamas-style views that reinterpret "is F" in "F-ness is F." At the same time, since it is an account of the basic way that Plato thinks about forms, it leaves open most metaphysical questions we might have about such things. Thus, it is compatible with various views of how self-predication fits into Plato's middle or late period metaphysics.

If this account is correct, it is natural to wonder how it relates to forms as described in the dialogues typically identified as middle period. This is far too large of a topic to provide a complete account. I will simply conclude by suggesting a few ways that this account helps us understand forms as described in the middle dialogues.

First, how can we reconcile the idea that forms are like appearances with Plato's contrast between forms and sensible things in these dialogues? Recall that forms, as I have described them, are importantly different from appearances – in particular, they are explanatorily prior, not misleading, and not limited to visual characteristics. So they are similar to appearances along some dimensions but dissimilar in others; this, in fact, makes contrasting forms with sensible things quite natural. Second, note that in contrasting forms with sensible things Plato frequently uses the same visual verbs for both forms and sensible things, and in some places this happens in

crucial parts of his arguments. Once we think of forms as like appearances, we can better understand why Socrates in the *Phaedo* (74b ff.), and *Republic* (479a ff.) compares the way ordinary things seem or appear (φαίνεται) to the way forms seem or appear. Once we view forms as importantly like appearances, it is natural to think that the forms are the sort of thing that always appear in a special way and so it makes sense to run the arguments with appearing. Forms have a distinctive way of appearing, different from how sensible things appear.[65] The form of equality appears entirely equal and not at all unequal, unlike the equal things.

This brings us to the role self-predication plays in a number of key arguments in the middle-period dialogues, such as the *Cratylus*, *Phaedo*, and *Republic*, where Socrates compares the feature of a form with that of sensible things. As in the *Protagoras*, it is very difficult to understand how these arguments work if we posit an ambiguity in the predication "is F." For example, in the *Phaedo*, one part of the recollection argument involves the claim that the equal sticks both appear to be (or we might want to translate: manifestly are) equal and unequal, whereas the equals themselves (simply) appear to be equal (74b-c). Socrates concludes from this that the equals themselves are different from the equal sticks. If "are equal" meant something different when applied to sticks and when applied the equals themselves, then the argument would baldly equivocate.[66]

In these arguments, the point is to compare the form of F-ness and sensible F-things along a certain dimension: their being or appearing F. For the arguments to make sense, both F-ness and the sensible F things must have some claim to the very same thing, being F, but be importantly different in the way that they are F. F-ness is F without qualification whereas ordinary things are F in a qualified way. The form is F according to itself, while the ordinary things are F because they participate in F-ness. By contrast, on ambiguity views, the form and the sensible are not making a claim to the same thing. In the *Hippias Major*, *Phaedo*, *Republic* V, and elsewhere Socrates thinks that predicates like "beautiful" or "equal" could never apply to a person in the same way that they apply to forms. But the claim is not that people are perfectly

[65] For a discussion of some of these issues, see White 1992.
[66] Penner thinks that such arguments are univocal, and that they simply mean (in the case of the *Republic*, *Phaedo*, and *Parmenides*) "Beautiful sights will no more be *what beauty is* than *what ugliness is*, and similarly for like sticks and likenesses" (104). He says that this is what Socrates thinks, even if it is perhaps not the words Socrates used (105). As mentioned earlier, Penner says that literal self-predication would be "*entirely* extraordinary. Crazy in fact" (9). I hope to have shown how we can accept the words Plato used without viewing him as crazy.

beautiful using a different sense of "beautiful." Instead, it is that they are, at best, beautiful in a qualified way.[67]

Lastly, consider the relation that ordinary things bear to the forms in the later dialogues. In the *Phaedo* (100d) and *Parmenides* (131e) Socrates thinks it is difficult to describe the right way to formulate and understand the relation between sensible things and forms. In the *Phaedo* he talks of forms as what things strive for, are deficient in relation to, and, at best, participate in. Considering forms as like appearances helps us understanding some of Socrates' new descriptions. Something can be deficient in comparison to an appearance or want to have an appearance, even an appearance it could never have. Similarly, it can resemble an appearance, just as sensible things are said to resemble the forms. In short, thinking of forms as like appearances can also help us understand why Plato puzzling way of describing this difficult relation.[68]

Appendix

"SP" refers to whether, for us, the proposal intuitively self-predicates (e.g., whether it is fine to say "What is dear to the gods is holy").

"U" stands for unclear – it can sound fine or not, depending on context or intonation.

Dialogue	Thing defined	Proposed definitions	Ref.	SP
Euthyphro	holiness	what is dear to the gods	6e-7a	Y
		what all the gods love	9e	Y
		the god-loved	10e	Y

[67] For this reason, I do not think we should accept Meinwald 1992's claim, 391, that her ambiguity account of the *Parmenides* can be seen as a friendly development of Plato's middle period views. If she is right that in the *Parmenides* "is F" involves one type of predication in cases where F-ness is F and another type of predication when an ordinary thing is F, Plato would either need to reject or modify his middle period arguments, which relied on there being only one type of predication.

[68] I have received valuable feedback from Liz Asmis, Joseph Barnes, Eric Brown, Agnes Callard, Emily Fletcher, Brad Inwood, Rachana Kamtekar, Joe Karbowski, Sean Kelsey, Richard Kraut, Connie Meinwald, Malcolm Schofield, John Wynne, and discussions at Cambridge's B Club, the Central APA, Chicago Area Ancient Philosophy Consortium, Northwestern's ancient philosophy workshop, the University of Kentucky, and the University of São Paulo.

		the part of the just concerned with care of the gods	12e	U
Charmides	temperance	a sort of quietness	159b	U
		modesty	160e	Y
		minding one’s own business	161b	Y
		knowing oneself	165c	Y
		a sort of science (of oneself)	165c	N
		to know what one knows and does not know	170d	Y
		the science of science and absence of science	171c	N
Laches	swiftness	the power to accomplish a great deal in a short time	192b	N
	courage	sort of endurance of the soul	192c	U
		wise endurance	192d	U
		some kind of wisdom	194d	U
		knowledge of the fearful and hopeful	195a	N
		knowledge of future goods, non-evils, and evils	198c	N
Meno	(a) shape	that which alone of existing things always follows shape	75b	Y
		that which limits a solid	76a	Y
	(a) color	an effluvium from shapes which fits the sight and is perceived	76d	Y
	Virtue (*)	to be able to rule over people	73c	Y
		to desire beautiful things and have the power to acquire them	77b	Y
		the power of securing good things	78c	Y
Republic	justice	speaking the truth and returning what one owes	331c-d	Y
		to treat one’s friends well and one’s enemies badly	332d	Y

		the advantage of the stronger	338c	U
		having and doing of one's own	433e	Y

(*) Attic Greek does not have the word "virtuous," just the word "good." In English, it sounds fine to say that the power to secure things is good, but not to say that it could be virtuous.

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